



Big Data As a Threat? An Alternative Approach to Cybersecurity

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Data Breaches and Cyber Attacks

- Exposure of corporate secrets, trade secrets, and other proprietary information
- Exposure of personally identifiable information (employees and customers), including health information
- Disruption/destruction of operations
- Attacks are cheap: (\$2 for crashing a website; \$30 for malware verification; \$5,000 for “zero day”)
- Malware now tends to be “one time use”




Who is Conducting Cyber Attacks?



Data-Borne Problems



- End-of-Life Issues
- “Insider Threat”
- Corrupted Data



Too Much Data?



Reduce Your Value



Disparate Information Risk Management

Records
Management

Cybersecurity


Privacy

E-Discovery


Information Risk Management

- Companies are starting to understand how fundamentally these information risks are related
- Projects in the various areas often overlap or produce conflicting work products
- Training efforts developed separately create feeling of training overload
- Companies want:
 - Holistic view of information and data
 - Understanding of what you have and where you have it
 - Ownership over information in the business
 - Disposal of unnecessary data
 - Better identification of high-value information assets
 - Improved protection, security and access

Integrated Information Risk Management




Records & Information Management “RIM” and Cybersecurity Complement Each Other in the Management of High Value Data (“HVD”)



Key Elements of an Integrated Program



Data inventory and Business Process Taxonomy



Key Elements of an Integrated Program



Facilitate routine, policy-driven disposition

Develop a risk-based,
phased approach to the
disposition
and remediation of
legacy data

Less data means less legal risk & less info to
protect, produce & recover

Centralization can manage redundancy, offering
greater insights into data & increased access to data

Routine disposition creates a culture in the
organization of separating high-value data
from low-value data

Many Theories of Liability

- Shareholder claims/
SEC Disclosures
- Loss of IP/trade secret claims
- Negligent selection, design
or contracting
- Failure to take “reasonable”
security measures for threats that
a company knew or “should have known” about
- Strict liability
- FTC/State UDAP claims, international regulator liability



What Would Litigation Look Like?

- From *FTC v. Wyndham*
- Failure to:
 - remedy “known security vulnerabilities” such as allowing insecure server/network connections
 - employ commonly used methods to require user IDs and passwords that are difficult for hackers to guess
 - adequately inventory computers in order to manage network devices
 - employ reasonable measures to detect and prevent unauthorized access or to conduct security investigations
 - follow proper incident response procedures, including failing to monitor computer network for malware used in a previous intrusion
 - adequately restrict 3d party vendor access
 - share threat information/act upon shared information
- How can you make sure you are taking “reasonable” cyber security measures?

The SAFETY Act

“Support Anti-Terrorism by Fostering Effective Technologies Act”

- Part of the Homeland Security Act of 2002
- **Eliminates** or minimizes tort liability for sellers of DHS-approved “technologies” should suits arise after an attack (physical or cyber), including:
 - SAFETY Act protections obtained only by submitting an application to DHS
 - **Applies to services, products, policies**
 - This includes **self-deployed programs**
 - Protections apply even if approved technologies are sold to **commercial** customers or if the attack originates from **abroad** so long as US interests implicated (i.e., economic losses)

Act of Terrorism = Cyber Attack

- Any cyber security product, service, and/or policy is eligible for SAFETY Act protections
- Cyber attacks are encompassed under this definition
- There is NO requirement that the attacker's identity or motivation be identified/proven:
 - Only mention of "intent" potentially relates to intent to cause injury or loss, NOT traditional "terrorist" intent
- This means that ANY cyber attack could potentially trigger SAFETY Act liability protections

Designation vs. Certification

- Two levels of protection under the SAFETY Act
- Under “Designation”:
 - Claims may only be filed in Federal court
 - Damages are capped at a level set by DHS
 - Bar on punitive damages and prejudgment interest
- Under “Certification” sellers also receive a presumption of immediate dismissal
- In both circumstances claims against **CUSTOMERS are to be immediately dismissed**

Key Questions and How To Use

- Any costs for filing a SAFETY Act application? **NO**
- What kind of cybersecurity products are eligible for SAFETY Act protections?
 - *All PRODUCTS, SERVICES, AND/OR POLICIES, INCLUDING INTERNAL POLICIES.*
- What is the practical effect of obtaining SAFETY Act protections?
 - **A cap on damages or immunity** from damages arising out of or related to cyber attacks.
- Can I realize SAFETY Act benefits just by purchasing and using SAFETY Act approved cyber security solutions? **YES**
- Can I require SAFETY Act approval in procurements? **YES**
- What kind of claims will this help mitigate/eliminate?
 - **Negligence, third party liability, failure to take reasonable mitigation steps, D&O claims**

Thank You for Participating!



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