Department of Energy Seeks Input for the 2026 Energy Critical Materials Assessment

Below we provide more information on the CMA and issues on which DOE is seeking input.

2026 Energy Critical Materials Assessment
The CMA will identify materials critical for energy, as defined by the Energy Act of 2020. Under this definition, a critical material is any non-fuel mineral, element, substance or material that the Secretary of Energy determines: (i) faces a high risk of supply chain disruption; and (ii) performs an essential function in one or more energy technologies, including those involved in the production, transmission, storage or conservation of energy.

In line with this definition, the CMA will assess criticality based on two primary factors: importance to energy and supply risk.

• Importance to energy will be weighed as follows: energy demand (70%) and substitutability limitations (30%).
• Supply risk will be weighed as follows: basic availability (40%); competing technology demand (10%); political, regulatory and social factors (20%); co-dependence on other markets (10%); and producer diversity (20%).

The 2026 CMA will consider “energy technologies essential to global energy deployment scenarios in four broad groups”:

• Production and generation, including nuclear, natural gas, oil and coal with related conversion technologies, biofuel, geothermal, hydropower, wind and solar technologies.
• Transmission, including advanced conductors, transformers and power electronics as part of the grid.
• Storage, including both chemical and electrochemical energy storage technologies.
• End-use technologies that contribute to energy conservation, including vehicles and technologies that are used in buildings, industry (including steelmaking), computing (including quantum and artificial intelligence) and data centers, such as lighting, microelectronics, semiconductors and relevant consumer electronics.

DOE may also consider “indirect raw materials” used in the manufacturing process but that do not contribute to the composition of the components or final products. As an example, DOE noted that helium is used in the cooling, cleaning and etching processes of semiconductor manufacturing with no viable alternatives.

In 2023, DOE identified the following minerals as critical for energy: aluminum, cobalt, copper, dysprosium, electrical steel (grain-oriented electrical steel, non-grain-oriented electrical steel and amorphous steel), fluorine, gallium, iridium, lithium, magnesium, natural graphite, neodymium, nickel, platinum, praseodymium, terbium, silicon and silicon carbide.

Request for Information
The RFI seeks input on various questions related to:

• Energy technologies of interest, including which specific energy production and generation (including nuclear), transmission and energy storage, and end-use technologies, including transportation, should be considered and included, which additional energy technologies should be considered, what substitutes exist for identified technologies, and what data sources should be used for estimating deployment trajectories for technologies.
• Materials of interest, including materials that should be evaluated given the energy technologies of interest, how engineered materials are manufactured, how indirect raw materials are used in the manufacturing processes and equipment of components, bottlenecks in materials, substitutes for materials, and end-uses other than energy technologies, including whether end-uses other than energy would pose competition for use in energy technologies.
• Supply chain information by material, including the major global players at each supply chain stage, the main barriers to production in the United States and globally, how global trade policies impact the material supply chain in the short and long term, operations currently under construction, whether the material can be sourced from unconventional sources (legacy mine tailings or brines), and new processes at each stage of production of the material that have been demonstrated but not yet scaled.
• Market dynamics by material, including responsiveness of supply and demand to price signals, factors (other than price) driving increases or reductions in supply or demand, flexibility of operations that produce or have the potential to produce co-products (or byproduct) in responding to market conditions and whether the output of the material can be adjusted to market conditions, drivers of the economics for projects that produce co-products, and the extent to which surplus material is produced and in what form it is stored.
• Challenges to domestic industry, including largest risks facing businesses related to critical materials, the regulatory and business environment, relevant regional differences, technical barriers and workforce.
• Methodology, which includes an assessment of technology deployment trajectories, which are drawn from the International Energy Agency’s (IEA) scenarios, and high- and low-technology-material-intensity value (i.e., quantity of material per component, product or system), which are drawn from DOE and industry experts. Taking these scenarios and projections into account, the list of energy materials is based on the material’s importance to energy and supply risk (as noted above). In connection with this methodology, DOE seeks input on issues including, among things, additional data sources that should be leveraged, the number of demand scenarios that should be developed per material, how the analysis of substitutability and recycling could be improved, whether multiple supply scenarios should be incorporated, and how processing and refining could be better included in the analysis.
• DOE and the Department of Interior’s (DOI) critical mineral lists, including recommendations for streamlining the lists and communicating the scope and intent of the lists. DOE’s list evaluates importance to energy and supply risk (as noted above), while DOI’s list evaluates potential of a supply disruption, dependency of the U.S. manufacturing sector on foreign supplies and vulnerability of the U.S. manufacturer sector to a supply disruption. According to the RFI, DOE’s list evaluates multiple demand scenarios in the short term (five years) and medium term (15 years), while DOI uses historical data.

We note that several categories of issues that DOE is seeking information on, including, in particular, materials of interest, supply chain information, market dynamics and challenges to domestic industry, were assessed in the IEA’s 2025 Critical Minerals Outlook. As we discussed in our previous alert, the Outlook identified demand for key minerals in the energy sector, market challenges—such as declines in prices, impacts on investment and economic challenges for mineral and co-product (or byproduct) production and production from mine waste, applications that drive demand for various minerals, and supply risks including export restrictions. The Outlook also made recommendations for diversification of supply chains, including market-based mechanisms, international partnerships and investment in new supply-side technologies. Issues relevant to the DOE RFI are also currently subject to the Department of Commerce (DOC) investigation under Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 (Section 232) of imports of processed critical mineral and derivative products, which we discussed here. In this regard, DOE advises commenters to “duplicate and/or supplement” information provided to the DOC under its Section 232 investigation.

The list of materials critical for energy is intended to inform implementation of DOE’s critical mineral projects through its Critical Minerals and Materials Program. Investing in domestic critical minerals projects, including for processing, is a priority of the Trump administration. As we discussed here, on March 20, 2025, the Trump administration invoked emergency powers in an Executive Order (EO) entitled, “Immediate Measures to Increase American Mineral Production,” aiming to accelerate domestic mineral mining and processing. This included, among other things, directing the Department of Defense and the International Development Finance Corporation to use Defense Production Act authorities to support domestic production of minerals. Given the various U.S. government agencies involved in funding or financing critical mineral projects, on June 30, 2025, President Trump issued a memorandum, “Simplifying the Funding of Energy Infrastructure and Critical Mineral and Material Projects,” directing the following:

• Each agency addressed in the memorandum—including the Departments of State, Treasury, Defense, Interior, Agriculture, Transportation, Energy, the Environmental Protection Agency, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), the Small Business Administration, the National Energy Dominance Council (NEDC), the Trade and Development Agency, the Export-Import Bank of the United States, and the International Development Finance Corporation—is directed to, within 60 days of the memorandum or by late August 2025, to modify existing information-sharing policies and initiate rulemaking as needed to permit information sharing described in the memorandum.

-  This includes sharing information with the chair of the NEDC regarding applications for funding and existing funding commitments related to “energy infrastructure or critical mineral or material-related projects,” (“relevant projects”) and permitting the chair to share relevant information with other agencies.

-  Agencies are also required to obtain consent by applicants or funding recipients of needed to share the information. Where consent is needed, agencies are directed to not obligate or disburse funds unless the applicant or funding recipient has provided consent.

• The Director of the OMB and the chair of the NEDC are to, within 180 days or by late December 2025, develop a common application for federal funding for relevant projects, which would include legal terms necessary to facilitate the aforementioned information sharing requirements.

While specific details—such as the programs that will use the application and agency-specific information required under particular program rules—are still to be determined, a common application and the associated information-sharing mechanisms have the potential to enhance interagency coordination in awarding projects. This could include coordination on projects at different stages of the supply chain—such as pre-feasibility, feasibility, mining and processing—including to ensure that outputs are suitable as feedstock for subsequent production phases. It could also facilitate better use of the expertise of relevant U.S. government industry experts, including those from the DOC, as part of the review of funding awards.